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Immigrant Circulation and Citizenship: Hotel Canada? 
 
Canada has experienced a unique problem as a subset of its immigrants, approximately 
10%, leave after ascension to citizenship.  In this paper I argue that both the degree of 
immigrant naturalization and subsequent emigration from Canada is conditioned by economic 
opportunities and Canadian citizenship policies.  A triangular model of movement comprising 
the concept of an entrepôt destination serves as a basis to argue that immigrants to entrepôt 
countries are faced with the decision to stay or leave after citizenship ascension.  Limited 
evidence is presented to support the conclusion that recently naturalized Canadian 
immigrants who leave for a third country (USA) or return home (Hong Kong) experience 
positive selection and overachieve. 
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"You can check out anytime you like, but you can never leave” 





Immigrant ascension to citizenship has often been viewed as a paramount step in the immigrant 
integration process.  The modern immigrant-receiving nation state recognizes this fact by often 
placing stringent criteria on the immigrant citizenship ascension process.  In this paper I argue 
that immigrants‟ ascension to citizenship is one step in a series of decisions on mobility which 
ironically may induce newly naturalized citizens to leave the host country.  
 
The economic consequences of this move affect the three agents involved in the migration 
process: the host state, the sending state, and the migrant.  It is the purpose of this paper to 
provide a model to predict the likelihood of recently naturalized citizens to stay or leave and to 
describe the economic consequences of their decision on the three agents.  The latter of course 
have dramatically different viewpoints on post-naturalization emigration (DeVoretz 2006).  
Newly naturalized citizens can see further emigration as a mechanism to increase their economic 
welfare, while policymakers in the host country may interpret post-naturalization emigration as a 
loss of heavily subsidized human capital which in turn creates an impending long-term economic 
liability.  In short, policymakers and citizens alike may come to feel that Canada plays the role of 
a hotel to short-term guests.  Finally, the sending country may induce return migration to capture 
the human capital embodied in émigrés along with associated networking gains. 
 
 
II. Triangular Movement 
The argument embedded in Figure 1 is that citizenship ascension occurs after immigrants 
migrate from the sender country (A) to the entrepôt country (B).  This entrepôt country is defined 
as an immigrant-receiving area that provides extensive subsidized human capital to recently 
arrived immigrants.  Thus, the decision to ascend to citizenship is embedded in a geographical 
space since it is made after time is spent in the entrepôt country (B).  This citizenship acquisition 
decision has further geographical implications since a new passport can facilitate further 
movement to (C) or the rest of the world (ROW).  However, citizenship ascension can in turn 
reduce the probability of returning to the sender country (A) if dual citizenship is not recognized 
by either country. 
                                                           
1 Don DeVoretz is a professor at Simon Fraser University and he can be contacted at devoretz@sfu.ca 2 
 
 















Moreover, while immigrants reside in the entrepôt country, forces appear to condition their 
decision to naturalize.
i  In particular, risk-adverse immigrants who want to invest in themselves 
leave country (A) as they are concerned with accumulating human capital.  In this triangular 
model the entrepôt destination differentiates itself from the ROW by the presence of private and 
public agents who provide subsidized human capital and free public goods (DeVoretz and Ma 
2002).  The subsidized provision of human capital includes language training, retraining for 
certification of credentials, extended welfare benefits and anticipated future social security 
benefits as well as subsidized formal education.  Moreover, with little or no waiting period, the 
entrepôt country provides three public goods to immigrants: family reunification privileges, 
citizenship, and a passport and near visa-free travel. 
On the other hand, the ROW is defined as a set of countries (e.g., the United States) where 
immigrants receive no subsidized human capital and must wait a long time to obtain public 
goods, and hence this environment attracts risk-taking immigrants.
ii 
Given the provision of subsidized human capital benefits, it is argued by DeVoretz and Ma 
(2002) that risk-averse immigrants will rationally choose the entrepôt destination or the ROW, 3 
 
and then refrain from, or ascend to, citizenship.  However, ascension to citizenship in an entrepôt 
destination will only occur if, at a later stage, a secondary calculation reveals that the costs of 
ascending to citizenship are lower than the benefits. 
What are the costs of ascension to citizenship?  The major cost arises in the absence of mutually 
recognized dual citizenship policy by both the sending and receiving countries, since under these 
conditions citizenship in the entrepôt country reduces or eliminates future access to the sending 
country‟s labour market.  The economic benefits to citizenship ascension are argued to include 
greater access to both the entrepôt‟s labour market and all labour markets accessible by the 
immigrant via the newly acquired passport from the entrepôt country. 
Several major predictions now appear under this triangular model which combines a 
geographical time-space dimension and an embedded utility-maximizing component to predict 
citizenship ascension.  These include immigrant self-selection: risk-averse immigrants choose 
country B and risk takers move directly to country C.  In addition, once in entrepôt country B, 
those immigrants who enjoy mutual dual citizenship recognition and have, while in residence, 
accumulated substantial subsidized human capital, will likely acquire citizenship.  Moreover, 
given the increase in their human capital and the anticipated access to a wider labour market 
post-naturalization, those immigrants who become citizens will have higher incomes. 
In sum, this triangular model predicts that risk-adverse immigrants will choose the entrepôt 
country and that some of them will selectively ascend to citizenship and reaps economic rewards 
from naturalization. 
 
III. Immigrant Decision Tree 
 
Figure 2 allows us to better understand the individual migrant‟s choice to stay or to move at each 
point in the triangle (countries A, B and C) and the role of the state in influencing that choice. At 
the outset I assume that our potential migrant in country A is myopic and will thus face a binary 





In Stage 1 the migrants can either choose to obtain a job, further their education or migrate to an 
entrepôt country (B) to obtain further education and/or gain subsidized general human capital, 
such as language skills, and a job.
iii  An alternative migration-education strategy faced by the 
migrant in country A is to immediately leave country A to obtain an education in the entrepôt 
country in Period I.
iv 
 
I argue that the majority of the migrants who leave country A will attempt to enter an entrepôt 
country (B) where two agents will confer added benefits on them.
 v  The first quasi-private agent 
in the entrepôt country (B) represents a publicly subsidized institution (university, non-
government organization) that confers subsidized benefits on successful student applicants in 
Period I of Stage II.  The second agent is the settlement worker who, by definition, provides 
limited general human capital (e.g., basic language training, adjustment to cultural mores, basic 4 
 
job search techniques) to enhance integration.  Settlement workers may also have altruistic 
motives, namely to ease the immigrant‟s integration into society.
vi 
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Stay (B)  Move (A/C) 
Home (A) 
Return (A)  Onward (C) 







Period I of Stage 2 
 
The second type of benefits conferred on migrants in the entrepôt country during Period I of 
Stage 2 are advanced forms of general human capital (enhanced language training, certification 
of past degrees, credential recognition, bridge training, etc.) more or less portable across 
economies.
vii  Why would an entrepôt country subsidize the acquisition of such human capital?  
Ironically the rationale most often cited in the entrepôt country is to induce migrants to stay at 
the end of Period I and repay (via taxes) their subsidized education.  However, when outside 
regimes (e.g., home or ROW) offer a greater reward for the migrants‟ subsidized capital, the 
probability of migrants leaving at the end of Period II increases.
viii  They can either move at the 
end of Period I in Stage 2 and return home (A) or favour a limited number of onward 
destinations (only C2 countries).
ix 
 
Period II of Stage 2 
   
Once our prototypical immigrant has acquired subsidized specific and general human capital and 
decides to stay in B at the end of Period I in Stage 2, several legal institutions and state 
instruments intervene to affect the decision to leave or to stay at the end of Period II in Stage 2.  5 
 
The first set of these state instruments stem from the country of origin (A).  The government in 
the sending country (A) may define the terms and conditions of return migration. 
 
Let us review two extreme cases of the terms and conditions embedded in country A's stylized 
passports which affect the potential returning migrant‟s decision to stay in country (B) or leave 
for home (A) at the end of Period II of Stage 2.  First, under passport P1, the sending country 
requires that the immigrant return at the end of Period II in country (B), or forfeit a previously 
posted bond.  Under passport P2 the sending country alternatively allows an indefinite extension 
of the migrant‟s stay in the entrepôt (B) or other countries (United States, ROW) without penalty 
or sanction.  Thus, the sending country (A) can either encourage or discourage the decision to 
stay in the entrepôt country (B) at the end of Period II of Stage 2 depending upon the type of 
passport issued in Stage I. 
 
At the end of Period II of Stage 2, a public agent may either compel or encourage the ascension 
to citizenship of the immigrant who remained in the entrepôt country (B).  In the extreme case, 
the immigrant may be compelled to exercise the right of ascension to citizenship or leave the 
entrepôt country. I n other words, the ascension to citizenship constitutes an "up or out" decision 
at the end of Period II in Stage 2 depending on whether or not citizenship is granted.
x  If it is 
rejected, migrants must leave for their home (A) or move onto another country (C2 or ROW).
xi 
 
If migrants successfully ascend to citizenship in the entrepôt country, the sending country may 
prohibit them from returning and working in their country of origin (A) by denying them dual 
citizenship.
xii  Thus, ascending to citizenship in the entrepôt country (B) can block a return move 
to country A, or allow a move to C1 (United States), and increase the probability of a move to 
C2.  These various outcomes are by products of the public good aspects of both citizenship and 
the resulting passport issued by country B.  As noted earlier, return movement to country A after 
ascending to citizenship in B is blocked by the lack of recognition in country A of dual 
citizenship.  However, country B's citizenship allows free access to any free mobility zone 
covered under various trade treaties (e.g., NAFTA for Canada) of which country B is a signatory.  
In this case, the new immigrant free rides on the inherent public good of citizenship in B which 
is recognized by country C1 (United States) through prior negotiation with citizens of country 
B.
xiii  I also argue that benefits of the past good actions of country B's past passport holders will 
confer mobility benefits on new passport holders in country B.  For example, new passport 
holders in the entrepôt country now will be allowed entrance to a larger set of countries in C2 
without the requirement of a visitor's visa or waiting in long queues to obtain a working visa.
xiv 
 
In sum, we have outlined the complexity of the choices faced by migrant residents of countries 
(A) or (B).  In fact, Figure 2 outlines seven possible strategies from (A-A-A) to (A-B-C2), and 
only under a few set of conditions will a dominant strategy appear unless we know the socio-
economic conditions of immigrants and the particular political institutions and regulations in 
each country.  In the next section, I will outline the most common strategies employed under 
Figure 2 by Canadian immigrants circa 2001 through reference to two case studies conducted 





IV. Economic and Mobility Impacts of Naturalization 
 
  Economic Impacts 
 
I argue at this point that the key institutional change that occurs in the immigrant path outlined in 
Figure 2 is the decision to ascend to citizenship. If an immigrant chooses to ascend to citizenship 
(and not all do) the substantial economic gains depicted in Figures 3 and 4 should lead the 
migrant to stay in country B.  
 
Figure 3 reveals actual sizable citizenship effects for both the Chinese and the British earnings 
functions in Canada. However, the citizenship effect on Chinese earnings is larger. A Canadian-
born age earnings profile is reported as a reference point (CB), and further highlights the 
citizenship effect on earnings. As noted, a Chinese immigrant experiences a substantial earnings 
disadvantage upon arrival, but ascension to citizenship results in increased earnings such as to 
nearly equal that of the Canadian-born. The observed citizenship effect on British immigrant 
earnings is smaller but sufficient to make these immigrants “overachievers”. In other words, 
without citizenship British immigrants do not suffer an initial earnings disadvantage relative to 
the Canadian-born. However, after obtaining citizenship, British immigrants become 




As shown in Figure 4 the economic impacts of citizenship on migrants from the United States 
and India were also favourable, with naturalized Indians deriving a larger reward from 







Naturalization and Mobility Impacts 
 
The sizable economic gains from citizenship ascension shown in Figures 3 and 4 are replicated 
in many countries as reported by Bevelander and DeVoretz (2008). However, there may still be 
economic incentives for newly naturalized citizens to move on to the ROW, return home 
(country A), or stay in country B, as depicted in Figure 2. Migrants may now choose a path to 
maximize their income stream net of costs given the citizenship effect, their human capital stock 
before and after moving, and the transactions costs of movement.  
Some examples should illustrate this choice. Suppose a newly naturalized immigrant is an 
economic overachiever in country B (Figures 3 and 4, naturalized British) and both countries A 
and B jointly recognize dual citizenship, then the newly naturalized citizen will remain in B.
xv 
However, if the economic premium derived from citizenship does not produce a „catch-up or 
cross-over‟ point for the naturalized immigrants (Figures 3 and 4, naturalized Chinese), then the 
immigrants may return home (country A) or move on to the ROW depending on the changing 
transaction costs associated with their new citizenship. If dual citizenship is not recognized by 
country A, then the newly naturalized citizens in country B will not return home. Their choice 
now becomes to stay in country B or move on to the ROW. Immigrants will leave country B if 
the economic prospects in the ROW are at least equal to those in country B and if their new 
passport lowers the transactions costs of movement to the ROW. In the real world this is exactly 
the case of Chinese naturalized Canadian citizens with respect to further movement to the United 
States.
xvi A third empirically relevant case is characterized by recently naturalized Ukrainians in 
North America. Given the confluence of a continuing faltering Ukrainian economy, Ukraine‟s 8 
 
lack of recognition of dual citizenship and the „overachiever‟ status of recently naturalized 
Ukrainians in North America little return or ongoing migration should be observed by 
naturalized Ukrainians in North America.
xvii  
V. Some Empirical Evidence 
  Citizenship Ascension 
The key prediction of this economic model of citizenship acquisition is that only if the net 
benefits of naturalization are positive will the immigrant ascend to citizenship. In turn if the 
economic benefits derived from citizenship acquisition are larger in the sending country or the 
ROW, the newly naturalized immigrant will leave and create the conditions of entrepôt or hotel 
status for the host country. Otherwise the naturalized immigrant will stay.  
The differential rates of immigrant naturalization in Canada reported in Figure 5 support the 
empirical findings presented in Figures 3 and 4 on the economic gains associated with 
citizenship acquisition.  
 
 
The older vintage of European and United States immigrants experience a mild spurt in 
citizenship acquisition in the first five years of eligibility, from 10% to 40%, but do not approach 
the Chinese or Indian rates of citizenship acquisition until after 45 years of residence in Canada.  
Why is there such a gap in citizenship acquisition across countries of origin and vintages of 
immigrants? Several forces appear in my model to affect the probability of citizenship 
acquisition across these vintages. However, where the economic benefits of citizenship 
acquisition are as large as those reported for China and India in Figures 3 and 4) the acquisition 
will be quick and robust, as shown in Figure 5.  9 
 
Additional differential benefits accrue to the Chinese and Indian nationals who acquire 
citizenship. These groups can now enter the United States labour market with a TN or NAFTA 
visa available only to Canadian citizens. Of course, United States and Western European 
immigrants to Canada already hold passports which allow entry to their holders into NAFTA or 
EU labour markets respectively. This reduces their incentive to naturalize as illustrated in Figure  
Citizenship Ascension and Mobility 
The empirical data shown in Table 1 documents which newly naturalized citizens will stay in 
Canada to create a permanent home and who will leave Hotel Canada. Table 1 reports the 
number of resident naturalized immigrants by country of origin over time corrected for survival 
rates and correcting for the 2006 census weights. In short I calculate the forward census survival 
group predicted by the number of residents in the previous census. If the actual number in the 
future census is smaller, outmigration has occurred. For example, the absolute outmigration for 
Hong Kong immigrants to Canada between 1996 and 2000 is 30,140, or the difference between 
the 1996 (165,450) and the 2000 resident Hong Kong population (135,310).
xviii 
Table 1  reports that for immigrants who arrived between 1960 and 1996 a select group from 
mainly Hong Kong, Taiwan, the United States, and Yugoslavia moved out at the respective rates 
of 18.2% (8.3 %), 25% (14%) 9% (2 %) 22.7% (39 %) over the period 1996-2000 (2001-2005). 
These are impressive rates for such short intervals. 
 




















Australia*  9,600  9,520  9,390  8,740  8,440  780  170 
China  117,880  116,720  114,930  109,780  113,940  6,940  -5,950 
France  36,280  35,940  35,420  33,270  32,140  2,670  610 
Germany  51,190  50,640  49,780  48,030  47,310  2,610  -140 
Greece  38,710  38,200  37,420  36,050  37,690  2,150  -2,420 
Guyana  56,370  55,910  55,210  54,880  54,710  1,030  -530 
Haiti  33,450  33,170  32,740  31,750  32,160  1.420  -840 
Hong Kong  166,690  165,450  163,570  135,310  122,150  30,140  11,280 
Hungary  13,160  13,010  12,780  11,600  11,650  1,410  -280 
India  164,780  163,330  161,110  159,840  164,150  3,490  -6,530 
Iran  32.470  32,210  31,820  27,840  27,160  4,370  290 
Italy  115,250  113,750  111,400  114,140  113,880  -390  -2,090 
Jamaica   80,140  79,460  78,410  76,660  74,570  2,800  290 
Japan*  9,690  9,600  9,450  8,680  8,300  920  230 
Lebanon  43,990  43,660  43,160  41,480  40,530  2,180  450 
Netherlands  26,260  25,960  25,500  25,510  25,720  450  -670 
New Zealand*  5,560  5,510  5,430  5,190  5,050  320  60 
Philippines  132,800  131,740  130,120  128,990  128,890  2,750  -1,520 10 
 
Poland  92,360  91,600  90,440  86,730  85,810  4,870  -240 
Portugal  106,540  105,550  104,020  102,720  101,620  2,830  -430 
Singapore*  5,260  5,220  5,160  4,790  4,540  430  190 
South Korea  30,150  29,860  29,420  27,190  26,120  26,780  630 
Sri Lanka  46,290  45,950  45,450  42,890  41,900  3,060  490 
Taiwan  29,460  29,200  28,800  21,850  18,400  7,350  3,050 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
45,150  44,730  44,080  42,540  41,490  2,190  400 
United 
Kingdom 
271,130  268,260  263,820  263,070  259,780  5,190  -1,150 
United States  134,820  133,620  131,770  121,340  117,090  12,280  2,400 
Vietnam  102,890  102,190  101,160  103,260  105,690  -1,070  -3,460 
Yugoslavia  30,960  30,670  30,230  23,700  13,920  6,970  9,340 
*Source: Author’s calculation from 1996 – 2006 Census of Canada 
 
Outmigration rates for the vintage of immigrants who arrived between 1996 and 2000 are 
presented in Table 2. Over the 2000-2005 period 54.5% of immigrants from the former 
Yugoslavia and 16% of Iranian immigrants left Canada. In addition, high percentages for China 
(6%), Hong Kong (14.3%), and Taiwan (20.3%) meant that Chinese-based immigrants to Canada 
were leaving at a crisp pace.  In sum Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the direction and size of Canada‟s 
outmigration and illustrate that both the older and newer vintages of immigrants from greater 
China, Iran and Yugoslavia are leaving Canada in substantial numbers, supporting the view that, 
for some immigrants, Canada is a hotel. 
 
Table 2: New Immigrants: Age in 2001: 21 to 55; Landing Year 1996 to 2000 
Selected Country  2001 weighted rounded  2001 weighted rounded 
5-yr survival 
2006 weighted rounded  Out-Migration 01-05 
Australia*  1,440  1,430  s.p.  180 
China  76,610  76,090  71,850  4,240 
France  9,000  8,950  7,140  1,810 
Germany  3,930  3,900  4,080  -180 
Greece  s.p.  s.p.  s.p.   
Guyana  4,960  4,930  4,860  70 
Haiti  3,530  3,510  3,860  -350 
Hong Kong  23,070  22,870  19,580  3,290 
Hungary  1,380  1,380  1,360  20 
India  57,510  57,110  63,160  -6,050 
Iran  18,660  18,510  15,550  2,960 
Italy  1,370  1,360  s.p.  110 
Jamaica  6,170  6,130  6,260  -130 
Japan*  3,610  3,590  3,110  480 
Lebanon  4,890  4,860  4,650  210 
Netherlands  2,070  2,060  1,880  180 
New Zealand*  s.p.  s.p.  s.p.   
Philippines  33,530  33,310  34,740  -1,430 
Poland  5,240  5,200  5,210  -10 
Portugal  1,620  1,610  1,830  -220 
Singapore*  s.p.  s.p.  s.p.   
South Korea  14,850  14,730  13,570  1,160 11 
 
Sri Lanka  15,110  15,010  14,760  250 
Taiwan  17,650  17,490  13,830  3,660 
Trinidad & Tobago  3,800  3,770  4,090  -320 
United Kingdom  10,860  10,780  11,140  -360 
United States  10,510  10,440  9,990  450 
Vietnam  7,190  7,160  7,680  -520 
Yugoslavia  9,690  9,620  4,370  5,250 
*Source: Author’s calculation from 1996 – 2006 Census of Canada 
   
Economic Consequences of Staying or Leaving 
 
If my theory is correct those immigrants shown to leave in Tables 1 and 2 should gain by their 
movement, and those who stayed should outperform the leavers. I now turn to empirical 
evidence to test this assertion in Canada‟s two main destination regions, the United States, and 
Hong Kong.  
 
  Naturalized Canadians in the United States 
 
The best estimate of the number of permanent Canadian citizens living in the United States circa 
2000 is 1,062,640, i.e., approximately 40% of all Canadians abroad. Canadians citizens in the 
United States included 920,900 Canadian-born émigrés and 141,740 naturalized Canadian 
citizens. Growth in both components of the resident Canadian citizen stock in the United States 
is evident across the decade 1990 to 2000. The 1990 United States Census reported the presence 
of 865,180 Canadian-born residents, for a modest 7% growth over the decade. The remainder of 
the growth can be attributed to naturalized Canadian citizens. 
xix 
My reference group to identify positive or negative sorting of foreign-born Canadian émigrés to 
the USA  will be Canadian-born citizens living in the United States in 2000. For naturalized 
Canadians I chose those Chinese born in China and the Indians born in India who resided in 
Canada in 1995 and appeared in the 2000 U.S. Census.  Educational attainment, age, and 
linguistic abilities are human capital attributes that indicate positive or negative sorting. 
Did the Chinese- and Indo-Canadian groups enter the United States with a great deal of human 
capital, as positive sorting would predict? Figures 6 and 7 respectively illustrate that the clear 







Figure 6: Self Reported English Skills for Indo-Canadians Resident in US 
 
 
Figure 7: Self Reported English Skills for Chinese-Canadians Resident in US 
 
 
Central to our triangular argument is the outcome that both of these subgroups should obtain 
high educational attainments. Figures 8 and 9 clearly show that both of these subgroups are well 







Source for Figures 6 - 9: Author‟s calculations US 2000 Census 
 
In addition, more Chinese-Canadians living in the United States either held a Masters or 
Doctoral degree relative to Indo-Canadians. These findings illustrate the power of the United 
States policy instruments (H1-B and TN visas) which require high educational levels to gain 
entry into the United States.  
Finally over 80% of the Chinese and Indo-Canadians living in the United States circa 2000 were 
in the economically active age group of 25-53. 
Positive sorting depends on more than intensive human capital content embedded in Canada‟s 
émigrés; it also requires corresponding high rewards in the labour market. The mean and median 
values for the total personal income for our two sub-samples are presented in Table 3.
  14 
 
 










Chinese-Canadian  313  $56,695   $50,000  
Indo-Canadian  175  $58,050   $43,000  
Source: Author’s calculations based on US 2000 Census Data excluding individuals not reporting their income and 
including only the employed. 
The arithmetic means for the two sub-samples – US$56,695 for Chinese-Canadians and 
US$58,050 for Indo-Canadians – are high, since the average total personal income per annum for 
all residents in the USA is US$36,058. 
It is important to note that the Canadian-born émigré population in the United States exhibits 
negative sorting in terms of the percentage of individuals in the prime working years of 21-50. In 
fact, the mean (median) age of the Canadians born in Canada is 30.7 (29) years owing to the 
large number of individuals below age 21.
xx Moreover, this mean age is well below the United 
States-born population‟s of 36 years. 
The Chinese- and Indo-Canadians in the United States are clearly more highly educated than the 
Canadian-born. The proportion of residents holding a Master or a Doctoral degree is greater for 
the Chinese-born, 72% as opposed to 17% for the Canadian-born who appear to get a Bachelor 
degree in 38% of the cases.  
The vast majority of the Canadian-born residents in the United States reported incomes heavily 
skewed to the left, of less than US$60,000. This is strong evidence of negative sorting, although 
a relatively large number of Canadian-born residents in the United States making in excess of 
US$150,000 raised the mean value of the earnings for the entire group. 
In sum, the Chinese- and Indo-Canadians who lived in Canada in 1995 and in the United States 
circa 2000 are very positively sorted by the emigration process after naturalization in terms of 
their demographic, educational and labour-market outcomes. In fact, they have stronger 
economic and educational attributes than the Canadian-born in the United States. Thus, while it 
is clear that Canada is losing valuable human capital through positive sorting of the foreign-born, 
it is less clear that positive sorting holds for the Canadian-born in the United States.  
  Naturalized Canadians in Hong Kong 
As reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4, 18% and 14% percent of naturalized immigrants from Hong 
Kong resident in Canada circa 1996-2000 and 2001-2005 left Canada, and the majority of them 
returned to Hong Kong. Within the triangle framework, this is a traditional move back home (A-15 
 
B-A). In this case, the sorting between stayers in Canada and leavers to Hong Kong is more 
ambiguous. The traditional neo-classical literature would argue that returnees are disappointed 
immigrants who failed in Canada; this failure would lead to negative sorting and lower returns to 
Hong Kong. However, my triangle theory also suggests that they may have come to the entrepôt 
country (Canada) to accumulate human capital and gain a valuable Canadian passport and with 
the intent to exploit their social networks in China upon return to Hong Kong to raise their 
income. Thus, I must appeal to empirical evidence to see if the sorting was positive or negative.  
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Table 4: Characteristics of Hong Kong-Born Returnees and Stayers in Canada Circa 2001 
 
Returnees to Hong Kong from 
Hong Kong-Born Stayers in 
Canada* 
   All  Canada  USA  Others   
Total  85793  100.0%  33676 (39.3%) 17778 (20.7%)  34339 (40.0%)  6955  100.0 
Age:               
0-19  8236  9.6  9.4  4.4  11.1  1506  21.7 
20-29  32430  37.8  37.5  39.4  37.6  1272  18.3 
30-39  19990  23.3  21.5  26.1  23.8  1745  25.1 
40-49  12354  14.4  14.9  14.4  14.1  1630  23.4 
50-59  6263  7.3  8.5  8  6.3  413  5.9 
60  6434  7.5  8.1  7.7  7.1  389  5.6 
Sex:             
Female  42811  49.9  53  48  49  3519  50.6 
Male  42982  50.1  47  52  51  3436  49.4 
Relation to Head of Household:       
Head  29170  34.0  33.5  35.9  33.9  1966  28.3 
Spouse  14756  17.2  18.2  18.0  16.3  1634  23.5 
Children  32430  37.8  38.2  37.1  37.7  2741  39.4 
Maid  86  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  n/a  n/a 
Others  9351  10.9  10.1  9.1  12.0  614  8.8 
Education:             
Primary School or less  9180  10.7  9.2  6.4  13.1  392  6.4 
Secondary School & Diploma  31314  36.5  40.3  23.6  37.5  4201  68.2 
Local Uni. Degree  12612  14.7  15.3  15.8  13.9  1571  25.5 
Overseas Degree  32687  38.1  35.2  54.2  35.5 
Occupation:             
Low Skill  13509  26.7  25.8  16.9  30.2  1068  27.7 
Assistant Professional  15584  30.8  33.7  29.8  29.2  951  24.7 
Professional  10726  21.2  16.9  28.4  21.9  1038  26.9 
Managerial  10777  21.3  23.6  25.0  18.7  796  20.7 
Total  50596  100  100  100  100  3853  100.0 
Earnings:             
1-5,999  2682  5.3  5.1  4.4  5.6  2382  45.7 
6,000-9,999  5970  11.8  10.0  8.3  14.1  739  14.2 
10,000-14,999  12345  24.4  26.7  17.6  24.7  753  14.5 
15,000-19,999  7994  15.8  17.0  17.6  14.7  552  10.6 
20,000-29,999  8348  16.5  18.3  17.5  14.8  525  10.1 
>=30,000  13256  26.2  22.8  34.6  26.0  256  4.9 
Total  50596  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  5207  100.0 
Median (HK Dollar/month)    16520.38  16500.00  20000.00  15500.00  7091.03 
Mean (HK Dollar/month)    25543.01  23314.00  33682.00  24657.00  10234.78 
Gini Coefficient**     .11.  .13  .55  .15  .34 
Source: 2001 census data, Department of Census and Statistics, Hong Kong SAR, PRC and 2000 Canadian census public use individual Microdata 
file, http://datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/census/mainmicro.html.  17 
 
Notes: 
*For earnings, sample selected: aged 15 and over; income > 0; adjusted to 2000 real CND dollar value; exchange rate as on Dec. 31, 2000 at 
CND$1 = HK$5.20777. 
**  Authors’ calculation.  
 
Table 4 provides a partial answer as to whether Chinese returnees to Hong Kong circa 2001 were 
positively selected. These returnees were highly concentrated in either the “head” of household 
group (34%) aged 30-39 or young adults in a household (37.8%) aged 20-29. In fact, comparing 
Hong Kong returnees to Hong Kong-born stayers in Canada reveals more heads of households 
(33.5% vs. 28.3%) and fewer spouses (17.2% vs. 23.5%) in the returnee group. This may 
indicate that Hong Kong returnees from Canada may more likely be heads of the household who 
perhaps left their spouse and/or children in Canada.
xxi 
Table 4 also reveals that Canadian returnees to Hong Kong have a high degree of post-secondary 
education (50%) and lead all other returning groups to Hong Kong, except those émigrés from 
the United States who report a 53% rate. Hong Kong stayers in Canada have a much lower level 
of reported educational attainment, with only 25% reporting a post-secondary education: 
Chinese-Canadian émigrés to Hong Kong are positively sorted in terms of education.  
A comparison of the occupational distributions of Canadian émigrés to Hong-Kong reveals 
minor negative sorting. In fact, returnees to Hong Kong are heavily concentrated in entry-level 
professional positions (34%) with higher level professional or managerial jobs constituting 40% 
of the returnees. The corresponding stayer groups in Canada report 27% of work in entry-level 
professional occupations and 46% in the managerial and professional grouping.    
The human capital characteristics coupled with the occupational distributions of the émigrés 
discussed above will ultimately affect the returnee groups‟ earning levels. Those who returned to 
Hong Kong from the United States earned more than all other groups, with Canadian returnees 
earning the least among all returnee groups. In other words, returnees from Canada to Hong 
Kong earn about 30% less than those returnees from the United States. However, Canadian 
returnees earn much more than Hong Kong-born stayers in Canada. Once more, this supports the 
sorting argument inherent in the triangular model. In fact, as shown in Table 4 the mean monthly 
earnings of Canadian returnees to Hong Kong is 2.3 times greater than that earned by Hong 




In sum, Canadian returnees to both of Canada‟s major émigré destinations, the United States and 
Hong Kong, have used Canada as an entrepôt destination and accumulated general capital 
(language, cultural understanding) and public goods (public education and citizenship) to exploit 
in another destination. Thus, these two groups show strong evidence of positive sorting; in turn 
this supports the choices of movement depicted in the triangular model. Whether this state of 18 
 
affairs requires intervention is not clear. First, the great majority of Canadian immigrants have 
not left Canada. Next, both Canadian-born and naturalized citizens form the majority of this 
exodus; there has been a limited policy response to this traditional „brain drain issue‟ in the 21
st 
century since it is viewed by Canadians as part of a more benign „brain circulation‟ issue. One 
major externality derived from a combination of citizenship acquisition and emigration is, 
however, cause for concern: the prospect of “checking out anytime you like, but never leaving”, 
i.e., émigrés returning to Canada upon retirement to draw large social benefits to which they 
have not contributed.   
 
                                                           
i See Bo (2005) for a theoretically derived set of conditions to move and stay or leave country B with or without citizenship acquisition. 
 
ii The ROW is characterized by no public goods provision to immigrants as well as a non-progressive income tax structure, thus attracting risk-
taking immigrants who shun public services and desire untaxed income. 
 
iii Two factors affect the educational state of the potential mover. First, the educational conditions in the sending region relative to the conditions 
in the receiving country will influence the choice to stay or move for education (see Zhang and DeVoretz, 2002). 
 
iv I omit the obvious possibility of moving from country A to country C (USA/R.O.W.) for education or employment for two reasons. First, we 
want to focus on the role of agents influencing the decision to move or to stay; by definition the USA has no agents. Second, the literature on the 
A-C movement is already extensive (Coulson and DeVoretz, 1992).  
 
v If students chose the United States or the ROW to study, then a second schematic would be needed. I recognize this possibility in Figure 1 and 
have modeled same with Zhang (DeVoretz and Zhang 2002) and refer readers to that exposition. 
 
vi However, in entrepôt countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, and especially Israel, government subsidies to private altruistic agencies is 
predicated on increasing the staying probability of the recent arrival and to increase the immigrant‟s contribution to the society. To this extent this 
governmental motive is not altruistic. 
 
vii It is also important to note that no employer would have an incentive to pay for general human capital since it is very portable. Hence,  
migrants would be forced to pay for this type of education if the state did not subsidize or completely provide it. 
 
viii DeVoretz and Iturralde (2000b) offer evidence of the very high rewards attached to subsidized education in an entrepôt country (Canada) for 
migrants who left to work in the United States. For example, the return of return on the education of a Canadian with a Canadian Bachelor of Arts 
who worked in Canada circa 1996 was 12% (pre-tax) as opposed to 44% for a migrant who moved to work in the United States. 
 
ix Note that entering the United States is excluded since one needs a passport issued by the host country according to this model. 
 
x Canada allows an application for citizenship in the first four years if three of the past four years were spent in residence in Canada 
[http://laws.justice.gc.ca/C-29/31864.html]. Other entrepôt countries such as Australia, Germany, and New Zealand have introduced minimum 
waiting periods before ascension to citizenship. 
 
xi Access to the United States is limited to only those immigrants in country B who ascend to citizenship. 
 
xii Many countries (Germany, Netherlands, United States, etc.) either deny or discourage dual citizenships. This places an implicitly high tax on 
ascending to citizenship in the entrepôt countries. 
 
xiii Also, immigrants ascending to citizenship in one member country of the European Union receive similar mobility rights in all member 
countries of the Union. 
 
xiv The public good aspect of citizenship in country B arises from the good behavior of country A's past citizen-travelers. 
 
xv This will be true only if the acquisition of country B‟s passport significantly does not lower the transaction costs of the newly naturalized 
immigrant‟s potential move to the ROW. This would be the case of a British naturalized citizen in Canada since his/her British passport generally 
allows easy access to the ROW. 
xvi Clearly this would be the case of any immigrant naturalized in an EU country who would in turn gain mobility rights in a subset of 24 other 
EU member states. 
 
xvii DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2008) document these conditions and mobility outcomes for naturalized Ukrainian immigrants in North America. 19 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
xviii A negative number indicates an inflow of immigrants from this country. 
  
xix The increase I the number  of Canadian citizens is no doubt  due to the availability of NAFTA-derived TN visas  which allowed Canadian 
citizens direct access to the United States: there was no numerical limit on these renewable one-year visas needed to work in over 66 occupations 
with only a bona fide job offer and relevant credentials required for valid admission. Of course other United States entry visas were available to 
highly skilled Canadians (H-1B, etc), but research has clearly shown that the TN visa dominated the inflow of Canadians during th e 1990‟s and 
led to either long-term residency or conversion to a permanent residency status. 
xx Canadian-born residents in the United States are older and no doubt have completed their families; this would explain the large proportion of 
Canadian-born children in the United States. 
 
xxi Under our triangular model returnees would want their children to receive a subsidized high-quality Canadian education and their spouses must 
stay in Canada to insure this outcome. 
 
xxii F. Tian and J. Ma (2008) reinforce these findings for Hong Kong with 2006 data.  